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This study investigated links between visual attention processes and conceptual problem
solving. This was done by overlaying visual cues on conceptual physics problem diagrams
to direct participants’ attention to relevant areas to facilitate problem solving. Participants
(N = 80) individually worked through four problem sets, each containing a diagram,
while their eye movements were recorded. Each diagram contained regions that were
relevant to solving the problem correctly and separate regions related to common incorrect
responses. Problemsets contained an initial problem, six isomorphic training problems, and
a transfer problem. The cued condition saw visual cues overlaid on the training problems.
Participants’ verbal responses were used to determine their accuracy.This study produced
two major ﬁndings. First, short duration visual cues which draw attention to solution-
relevant information and aid in the organizing and integrating of it, facilitate both immediate
problem solving and generalization of that ability to new problems. Thus, visual cues can
facilitate re-representing a problem and overcoming impasse, enabling a correct solution.
Importantly, these cueing effects on problem solving did not involve the solvers’ attention
necessarily embodying the solution to the problem, but were instead caused by solvers
attending to and integrating relevant information in the problems into a solution path.
Second, this study demonstrates that when such cues are used across multiple problems,
solvers can automatize the extraction of problem-relevant information extraction. These
results suggest that low-level attentional selection processes provide a necessary gateway
for relevant information to be used in problem solving, but are generally not sufﬁcient for
correct problem solving. Instead, factors that lead a solver to an impasse and to organize
and integrate problem information also greatly facilitate arriving at correct solutions.
Keywords: overt visual attention, physics education, problem solving, visual cognition, automaticity
INTRODUCTION
This study investigated links between visual attention processes
and conceptual problem solving. This is challenging, becausemost
of what we know about attention has to do with its lower-level
perceptual processes, and most of what we know about prob-
lem solving has to do with much higher-level cognitive processes.
Thus, forging a link between lower-level perception and higher-
level cognition is difﬁcult. A vast literature has developed over
the past 40 years explaining the low-level stimulus factors that
capture attention and eye movements, and the effects this has
on early visual perceptual processes. For example, motion has
been shown to reliably capture eye movements (overt attention;
Carmi and Itti, 2006; Mital et al., 2010), as mediated by the supe-
rior colliculus in primates (Kustov and Robinson, 1996; Findlay
and Walker, 1999; Boehnke and Munoz, 2008), and the optic
tectum in lower animals, including toads (Borchers and Ewert,
1979). In turn, selective attention has been shown to improve per-
ceived brightness, acuity, and contrast sensitivity (Carrasco et al.,
2000, 2002; Cameron et al., 2002), as mediated by an increased
signal-to-noise ratio of cells as early as the primary visual cortex
(Fischer and Whitney, 2009; Pestilli et al., 2011). However, despite
the tremendous strides that have been made in understanding the
low-level causes and effects of visual selective attention, much
less is known about high-level cognitive causes and effects of
visual selective attention. Admittedly, a sizeable body of research
has shown strong relationships between tasks and selective atten-
tion, as measured by eye movements (Foulsham and Underwood,
2007; Henderson et al., 2007; Einhäuser et al., 2008), and between
selective attention, as measured by eye movements, and memory
(Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; Zelinsky and Loschky, 2005;
Pertzov et al., 2009). Nevertheless, far less research has investi-
gated such causal relationships between visual selective attention
and eye movements on the one hand, and quintessentially higher-
level cognitive processes such as those involved in problem solving,
on the other.
In the current study, we speciﬁcally investigate the relationships
between visual selective attention and the cognitive processes
involved in solving physics problems, which are among the most
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intellectually and cognitively demanding that human beings are
capable of engaging in. Indeed, one might reasonably ask whether
such low-level perceptual functions as those involved in selective
attention could really play much of a role in such a high-level
cognitive task. However, several studies over the last decade have
shown exactly that, namely that cueing people’s attention in spe-
ciﬁc ways while they solve insight problems can signiﬁcantly affect
their solution accuracy (Grant and Spivey, 2003; Thomas and
Lleras, 2007, 2009). In the current study, we have investigated
these processes in the context of learning from problem solving.
However, evidence of learning, as shownby increasedperformance
on problem solving tasks alone, while clearly implicating memory
formation, cannot elucidate the links between online attentional
selection and the higher-level cognitive processes involved in
physics problem solving. We therefore elucidated the online pro-
cesses that link attention selection and physics problem solving by
using eyemovement data in conjunctionwith increases in problem
solving performance.
BACKGROUND
SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND EYE MOVEMENTS
We assume that eye movements are linked to attentional selec-
tion as proposed by the rubber band model of eye movements
and attention (Henderson, 1992, 1993). Speciﬁcally, at the
beginning of each eye ﬁxation, attention is aligned with the
point of ﬁxation (van Diepen and d’Ydewalle, 2003; Glaholt
et al., 2012; Larson et al., 2014), but by roughly 80 ms before
the next eye movement, covert attention is shifted to the to-
be-ﬁxated object (Kowler et al., 1995; Deubel and Schneider,
1996; Caspi et al., 2004), after which the eyes make a sac-
cade to the newly attended object. Thus, although attention
may be at a different location than the point of ﬁxation (espe-
cially in the last 80 ms of a ﬁxation, called covert attention;
Caspi et al., 2004), if the eyes are sent to a location, we know
that attention was there at the beginning of the ﬁxation. One
can therefore retrospectively measure the location of atten-
tional selection by measuring eye ﬁxation locations, called overt
attention.
As noted earlier, research on attentional selection has made
tremendous strides in explaining the effects of stimulus char-
acteristics, or bottom-up inﬂuences, on overt attention. These
studies have shown that stimulus saliency, as measured by con-
trast along various feature dimensions coded by early visual
cortex (e.g., luminance, color, orientation, and motion), plays
a moderately strong causal role in determining where the eyes
are sent (Irwin et al., 2000; Itti and Koch, 2000; Mital et al.,
2010). Other research has shown non-stimulus-based effects,
or top-down inﬂuences, on overt attention. These top-down
inﬂuences can be further divided between those that are invol-
untary and automatic, based on experience and learning, called
mandatory top-down processes, and those that are voluntary
and effortful, called volitional top-down processes (Baluch and
Itti, 2011). Numerous studies have shown evidence of manda-
tory top-down effects on overt attentional selection in scenes
(e.g., attention to stop signs when they are in expected loca-
tions, such as intersections, but not in unexpected locations,
such as the middle of a block; Theeuwes and Godthelp, 1995;
Shinoda et al., 2001). A separate body of research has shown
effects of volitional top-down processes on overt attention in
more laboratory-based tasks (e.g., the anti-saccade task, in
which one looks in the opposite direction from a salient visual
stimulus; Everling and Fischer, 1998). Overall, mandatory top-
down processes have been shown to generally have a stronger
inﬂuence on overt attentional selection than bottom-up visual
saliency (Foulsham and Underwood, 2007; Henderson et al., 2007;
Einhäuser et al., 2008). Conversely, because volitional top-down
processes require executive attentional and working memory
(WM) resources, they generally have weaker effects on overt
attentional selection than bottom-up saliency, as shown by the
antisaccade task, in which the sudden appearance of a simple
stimulus is very difﬁcult to avoid reﬂexively looking at, while
it takes a conscious effort to looking in the opposite direc-
tion (Guitton et al., 1985; Mitchell et al., 2002). Nevertheless, a
far fewer number of studies have investigated the relationships
between bottom-up and top-down processes and overt atten-
tional selection in higher-level cognitive tasks such as problem
solving.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN PROBLEM SOLVING
In order to discuss the relationship between overt attentional
selection and the cognitive processes involved in problem solving,
we must ﬁrst specify what those higher-level cognitive processes
might be. We are particularly interested in the cognitive processes
involved in conceptual problems requiring insight, in which the
solution is not immediately apparent, and solvers cannot simply
adopt an algorithmic approach to ﬁnding a solution (Duncker,
1945; Ohlsson, 1992; Jones, 2003). Ohlsson’s (1992) represen-
tational change theory provides a framework to understand the
cognitive mechanisms involved in solving problems that require
conceptual insight, rather than purely algorithmic computation.
This framework lends itself to our work on conceptual problem
solving. Speciﬁcally, the problems we study are conceptual in
nature because they require the solvers to recognize the appro-
priate physics concepts to apply. Recognition of the appropriate
concept often comes to the solver in a moment of insight. While
encoding the problem, the solver activates (apparently) relevant
prior knowledge, which is used to construct a mental representa-
tion of the problem. This representation is then used to ﬁnd a path
to the solution. However, in insight problems, solvers commonly
make several unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem, which
forces them into an impasse, in which they realize that no path to
the solution is apparent. In order to break the impasse, the solver
must often restructure their mental representation of the problem
in order to ﬁnd a viable solution path. This produces the insight
that then rapidly leads to solving the problem. Ohlsson’s (1992)
theory provides a good framework for understanding a number of
important cognitive processes involved in insight problem solving,
but is relatively silent with regard to what roles, if any, attentional
selection plays in problem solving.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON OVERT ATTENTIONAL SELECTION AND PROBLEM
SOLVING
Prior research on eye movements and problem solving has shown
that overt attention can illuminate the cognitive processes involved
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in problem solving (Epelboim and Suppes, 2001; Knoblich et al.,
2001, 2005; Grant and Spivey, 2003; Jones, 2003; Thomas and
Lleras, 2007, 2009; Bilalic´ et al., 2008; Eivazi and Bednarik, 2010,
2011; Madsen et al., 2012, 2013a,b; Lin and Lin, 2014; Susac et al.,
2014). However, we are particularly interested in two directions
of causal relationships between overt attentional selection and
the higher-level cognitive processes involved in problem solving:
(1) the causal relationship starting from higher-level cognitive
processes involved in problem solving and ending with atten-
tional selection; and (2) the reverse causal relationship starting
from attentional selection and ending with the higher-level cog-
nitive processes involved in problem solving. A relatively small
number of studies have investigated each of these relationships,
with some speaking more to the effect of higher-level cognitive
processes in problem solving on attentional selection (Epelboim
and Suppes, 2001; Knoblich et al., 2001; Madsen et al., 2012),
and others speaking more to the effect of attentional selection
on higher-level cognitive processes in problem solving (Epelboim
and Suppes, 2001; Cameron et al., 2002; Grant and Spivey, 2003;
Tai et al., 2006; Thomas and Lleras, 2007, 2009; Lin and Lin, 2014;
Susac et al., 2014).
Research on the effect of the cognitive processes involved in
problem solving on overt attentional selection has shown that
mandatory top-down processes based on prior knowledge can
enable solvers to rapidly attend to relevant information when
solving a problem (Epelboim and Suppes, 2001; Madsen et al.,
2012). In the most extreme cases, based on prior knowledge,
an expert may attend to the relevant information in a prob-
lem within the time frame of a single eye ﬁxation, while a
novice may instead take much more time while attending to
various sources of irrelevant information (Charness et al., 2001;
Reingold et al., 2001). Just as importantly, however, even if the
solver has previously activated irrelevant knowledge, leading to
an impasse, restructuring the problem representation can lead to
shifting overt attention away from irrelevant information to rel-
evant but previously ignored information (Knoblich et al., 2001;
Jones, 2003).
Research on the effect of attentional selection on the cogni-
tive processes involved in problem solving suggests that there
are at least two qualitatively different types of effects. First,
attentional selection can lead either to processing relevant infor-
mation, which facilitates problem solving by activating rele-
vant domain knowledge, leading to ﬁnding a viable solution
path, or processing irrelevant information, which impedes prob-
lem solving by activating irrelevant knowledge, leading to an
incorrect solution path (Grant and Spivey, 2003; Thomas and
Lleras, 2007, 2009; Madsen et al., 2012, 2013a). This effect of
attentional selection on problem solving determines whether
or not the solver, in a manner of speaking, gets through
the starting gate to ﬁnding a viable solution path. Second,
if a solver has gotten through the starting gate by attend-
ing to relevant information, further attentional selection of
aspects of that relevant information appears to be important
for not only extracting further relevant information, but also
refreshing their WM representations used in ﬁnding the solu-
tion path. Here, we assume that problem solving occurs in WM
(Ohlsson, 1992; Epelboim and Suppes, 2001), and that WM
has a limited capacity (Baddeley, 1994; Luck and Vogel, 1997;
Cowan, 2001). Thus, if the process of ﬁnding a viable solu-
tion path involves establishing relationships between numerous
conceptual entities, solvers may experience difﬁculties caused
by exceeding their WM capacity (Epelboim and Suppes, 2001).
Because maintaining representations in WM requires attention
(Cowan, 2001), one can refresh WM representations by attend-
ing to them (Hale et al., 1996; Awh et al., 1998; D’Esposito
et al., 1999), for example by repeatedly reﬁxating the eyes on
the to-be-processed items (Zelinsky et al., 2011). Thus, during
problem solving, attentional selection, as evidenced by reﬁxat-
ing relevant information, can facilitate ﬁnding a solution path
by refreshing the WM representations for the ﬁxated items
(Epelboim and Suppes, 2001; Tai et al., 2006; Lin and Lin, 2014;
Susac et al., 2014).
Adifferentway inwhichovert attentional selection can facilitate
problem-solving processes in WM is through sustained atten-
tion, which involves inhibiting overt and covert attentional shifts.
Speciﬁcally, when a solver is engaged in complex problem solving
processes in WM, longer than normal processing times are some-
times needed in order to attend to the current contents of WM. In
those cases, it would be counter-productive to move attention and
the eyes to a new location, which automatically triggers extract-
ing the new information there into WM (Belopolsky et al., 2008),
potentially displacing some of the current WM contents (Zelin-
sky and Loschky, 2005). Instead, the solver may inhibit moving
the eyes, resulting in a longer eye ﬁxation at the current location
(Findlay and Walker, 1999). Thus, during the process of breaking
an impasse (i.e., themoment of insight), problem solvers will often
produce longer ﬁxation durations, rather than making more ﬁxa-
tions on different items (Knoblich et al., 2001; Velichkovsky et al.,
2002; Jones, 2003).
The above discussion sets the stage for discussing our pre-
vious work on overt attentional selection and physics problem
solving. Our research was inspired by the groundbreaking work
of Thomas and Lleras (2007, 2009), which demonstrated that
shifting overt or covert attention in ways that embody the solu-
tion to Duncker’s (1945) tumor problem improved performance
on it, even without solvers being aware of the relevance of the
cueing to ﬁnding the problem’s solution. The concept of hav-
ing attentional movement trajectories embody the solution to
a problem, while powerful, may not apply to solving a wide
array of problems. However, the simpler relationship between
what is selected for visual attention and how that affects prob-
lem solving cognitive processes can be investigated in most if
not all problems involving ﬁgures. Our particular approach to
investigating this issue has been to use speciﬁc physics prob-
lems that contain two distinct regions, those associated with
well-documented misconceptions and those associated with cor-
rectly solving the problems. In this way, a direct connection
can potentially be found between overt attentional selection and
problem solving cognitive processes. The results of these stud-
ies showed that when attempting to solve such problems, solvers’
overt attention was strongly guided by mandatory top-down pro-
cesses (prior knowledge, either correct or mistaken) to either the
relevant or irrelevant regions respectively (Madsen et al., 2012,
2013a). Importantly, those who overtly attended more to the
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relevant information were more likely to correctly solve the prob-
lems, and those who overtly attended to regions associated with
well-documented misconceptions more frequently gave incorrect
answers in line with those misconceptions. This raised the ques-
tion of whether guiding solvers’ overt attention to the relevant
information would facilitate their correctly solving those or sim-
ilar problems. In one study, we modiﬁed the bottom-up visual
saliency (as measured by a computational model) of the rele-
vant vs. irrelevant regions in physics problems (by increasing
or decreasing the luminance contrast of the lines in the prob-
lem diagrams; Madsen et al., 2013b). Interestingly, we found
that solvers’ mandatory top-down processes (prior knowledge)
guided their overt attention, overwhelming any potential effects of
stimulus saliency (Madsen et al., 2013b). Nevertheless, as before,
those who attended more to relevant information were more
likely to correctly solve the problems (Madsen et al., 2012). In
another study, we used highly salient visual cues (moving col-
ored dots) that mimicked the overt attention shifts that correct
solvers often made while solving those problems, and asked the
solvers to follow the dots with their eyes (without explaining
why) while they solved the problems (Madsen et al., 2013a). We
found that the moving dot cues often guided solvers’ overt atten-
tion to the relevant areas (assumedly based on both bottom-up
stimulus saliency and volitional top-down processes). However,
the highest percentage of cued participants answering a training
problem correctly was 41%, which was not signiﬁcantly higher
than the 32% in the uncued condition. Further, the cued par-
ticipants signiﬁcantly outperformed the uncued participants on
the training problems in only one of the four problem sets. Like-
wise, the cued participants signiﬁcantly outperformed the uncued
participants on the transfer problem in only one of the four prob-
lem sets (Madsen et al., 2013a). Thus, getting solvers through
the starting gate, by guiding their overt attention to relevant
information, was often insufﬁcient to facilitate correct problem
solving.
In sum, our prior work has shown that higher-level cognitive
processes involved in physics problem solving very strongly guide
solvers’ overt attentional selection. Furthermore, overt attentional
selection of relevant (rather than irrelevant) information is associ-
ated with a higher probability of correctly solving such problems.
However, we have also shown that simply guiding solvers’ overt
attention to relevant areas of physics problems is often insufﬁcient
to correctly solve those problems, or transfer problems similar to
them.
THE CURRENT STUDY
Our prior results described above left important open research
questions. Speciﬁcally, althoughpreviouswork clearly showed that
higher cognitive processes strongly affect attentional selection dur-
ing insight problem solving, much less clear is the degree to which
attentional selection, as guided by visual cues, can strongly affect
higher-level cognitive processes involved in conceptual physics
problem solving.
We therefore considered our previous results in terms of their
relationship toOhlsson’s (1992)model of insight problem solving,
which suggested that we make several changes to our method-
ology. These changes were done in order to facilitate both the
guidance of overt attention to relevant information, and the use
of that information to restructure solvers’ representations of the
problems and ﬁnd correct solution paths. Speciﬁcally, although
several previous studies had shown that the solvers’ success rate
in solving Dunker’s radiation problem could be increased by their
cueing attention without explaining why (Grant and Spivey, 2003;
Thomas and Lleras, 2007, 2009), we repeatedly found that sim-
ply guiding solvers’ attention to the relevant information in a
problem was insufﬁcient for them to arrive at a correct solution
path (Madsen et al., 2012, 2013a). Thus, we decided to explicitly
indicate to solvers that the cues were relevant to solving the prob-
lems, by referring to the cues as “hints,” which were meant to help
them.
In addition, we previously observed that solvers who were
incorrect on the ﬁrst problem in a set of similar problems tended
to repeatedly use the same incorrect solution path for every prob-
lem in the set. Thus, in terms of Ohlsson’s (1992) model of
insight problem solving, the solvers were apparently not facing
an impasse that would force them to restructure their faulty rep-
resentation of the problem. This points out a difference between
our problems and many common insight problems, for exam-
ple Maier’s two-string problem (Maier, 1931). In our problems
the solver may not know that they have failed to reach the goal
state, whereas many insight problems are structured such that fail-
ure to reach the correct goal state is self-apparent. We therefore
decided to provide the solvers with correctness feedback (i.e., say-
ing“correct”or“incorrect”without explainingwhy) after they gave
their answer to each problem. This would facilitate their enter-
ing an impasse for those problems they solved incorrectly, with
the idea that solvers could then potentially break their impasse
by restructuring their representations of those problems. In such
cases, the visual cues could direct solvers’ attention to relevant
information, which could activate previously dormant relevant
knowledge from long-term memory, enabling the solver to create
a new representation for the problem that could break the impasse.
In order to determine the individual effects of correctness feed-
back and visual cueing on overt attention and problem solving,
we manipulated both factors independently in our experimental
design.
We also incorporated a key idea from de Koning et al.’s (2009)
model of attentional cueing for learning, speciﬁcally that cues
can be used not only to facilitate selecting important information
for attention, but also to facilitate integrating information across
different regions within a problem. For instance, cues can facili-
tatemaking comparisons between different elements of a problem,
such as comparing the distance traveled at different points in time,
or comparing the slopes of two curves on a graph. Such cues still
function to direct the solvers’ attention, but go beyond simply
directing attention to a location in space by symbolically indicat-
ing the types of information to attend to at those locations, and
between different locations over time.
In order to measure changes in attentional selection and prob-
lem solving over time (i.e., learning), as in our previous studies
(Madsen et al., 2013a), for each base problem,we created a series of
similar problems, which will be discussed in the Methods section.
Furthermore, as in our previous studies (Madsen et al., 2013a), in
order to test for more than just superﬁcial learning, we created
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transfer problems that used the same underlying reasoning (and
solution paths), but had somewhat different surfaces features. In
addition, we did not use cues on either the initial problem for each
sequence, or on the transfer problem for that sequence, in order
to measure both overt attentional selection and problem solving
cognitive processes in the absence of cueing.
Given the above discussion, it is worth considering what
changes in perceptual and higher level cognitive processing might
occur as a consequence of learning engendered by cueing prob-
lem solvers on successive trials, each with a similar problem that
differs only minimally in its surface features from the previous
problem, and then testing on a transfer problem that differs more
substantially in its surface features. Changes in solvers’ problem
representations could be measured off-line in terms of giving cor-
rect answers on the transfer problems by solvers who had given
incorrect answers on the initial problem for that problem type. Of
particular interest for the current study, we can also measure such
changes in the solvers’ problem representations on-line in terms
of eye movement data, for example by solvers overtly attending
to relevant information on transfer problems that they had previ-
ously ignored in the initial problem of that problem type. A more
speciﬁc hypothesis is that solvers who had previously been cued
would have learned to attend to the relevant information, and
thus spend more time processing the relevant information on the
transfer problem than those solvers who had not been previously
cued. We will call this the processing priority hypothesis. Interest-
ingly, however, an alternative competing hypothesis is suggested
by considering a further aspect of learning, namely automatiza-
tion (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977), which could be measured
in terms of increased efﬁciency of information extraction and
integration into a solution path in WM. Assumedly, repeatedly
attending to relevant information and using it to create a similar
correct solution path would engender greater automaticity (i.e.,
efﬁciency) in performing each of these perceptual and cognitive
processes. Automatization as shown by eye movements could be
measured in terms of ﬁxation durations, which are generally taken
as an indication of processing difﬁculty (Rayner, 1998; Nuthmann
et al., 2010). Thus, to the degree that relevant information extrac-
tion and integration is automatized, it should produce shorter
ﬁxation durations. More speciﬁcally, an alternative hypothesis
is that solvers who had previously been repeatedly cued should
process the relevant information in a more automatized man-
ner, and thus have shorter ﬁxation durations on the relevant
information on the transfer problem than those solvers who had




The participants in this study (N = 80, 44 males, 36 females) were
enrolled in a ﬁrst semester algebra-based physics course and were
compensated with course credit. All participants had uncorrected
or corrected-to-normal vision.
STIMULI
Four problem sets were investigated in this study and cov-
ered the topics of speed and energy conservation. Participants
covered the requisite material in their course before being
recruited to participate in the study. The problem sets exam-
ined in this study all contained diagrams with features consistent
with novice-like answers documented in the literature and sep-
arate areas relevant to correctly solving the problem (Madsen
et al., 2012). Each set consisted of eight problems: an initial
problem, six isomorphic training problems, and a transfer prob-
lem. The transfer problem assessed the same concept as the
other problems in the set, but had different surface features
(e.g., Reed, 1993). An example of a problem set is provided in
Figure 1.
The cues were described to the participants as hints, which
were meant to help them solve the problem. When ready to view
the cue, the participants pressed a button. All participants in cued
conditionswere required to view the cue at least once, but therewas
no limit on the number of times they could replay it. Explanations
of the critical information needed to solve each problem, along
with examples of the cues for those problems are provided in
Figure 2.
The problems were presented to participants on a computer
screen. The screen had a resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels and
a refresh rate of 85 Hz. The images subtended 33.3◦× 25.5◦ of
visual angle. Participants used a chin and forehead rest that was
24 inches from the screen. Eye movements were recorded with an
EyeLink 1000 desktop mounted eye-tracking system which had an
accuracy of less than 0.50◦ of visual angle.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
This study was part of a larger study in which we investigated the
effect on problem correctness due to both feedback and visual cues
(Rouinfar et al., 2014). In this paper we focus on the analysis of
the eye movement data, though we use accuracy data to show evi-
dence of learning to make arguments linking the eye movements
to learning.
Each participant took part in an individual session lasting
50–60 min. At the beginning of the session, participants were
given a short explanation of the goal of the interview and given
instructions. The eye tracker was calibrated to the individual
using a nine-point calibration and validation procedure, with a
threshold agreement of 0.5◦ visual angle required to begin the
experiment.
Participants were randomly assigned either a cued condi-
tion (N = 38, 22 males, 16 females) or an uncued condition
(N = 42, 22 males, 20 females). Those in the cued condi-
tions saw colored shapes superimposed on the diagrams of the
training problems for 8 s, but not on the transfer problems.
All participants worked through four sets of problems. The
order of the problem sets and the training problems within
each set was randomized. Participants were told to spend as
much time as they needed on each question and to give a verbal
answer and explanation whenever they were ready. The partici-
pants were able to point to areas on the computer screen while
explaining their answers if necessary. The experimenter used a
pre-deﬁned rubric to determine if the given answer and explana-
tion were correct or incorrect. The experimenter would ask for
clariﬁcation if the participant provided a vague answer or expla-
nation. To be considered correct, the responses were required
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FIGURE 1 | Example of an initial problem (top), one of the six training
problems (middle), and a transfer problem (bottom).
to contain both the correct answer and scientiﬁcally correct
explanation.
RESULTS
The current study reports on eye movement data collected in an
experiment reported in more detail in Rouinfar et al. (2014). That
experiment factorially manipulated both cueing and feedback and
found signiﬁcant main effects of both factors, but no interaction
between them, on accuracy of physics problem solving. That study
did not report on the eye movement data, which is the focus of
the current study. The current study analyzed the effects of both
cueing and feedback, but found no signiﬁcant main effects of
feedback, nor any interactions of feedback with cueing, on any eye
movement measures. Therefore, to streamline our description of
our results, we have collapsed across the feedback factor and will
not discuss that factor further.
CORRECTNESS
We were ﬁrst interested in the pedagogical effectiveness of the
visual cues in helping participants correctly solve and reason
about the problems. Figure 3 shows the average percentage
of initial and transfer problems solved correctly (correct in
terms of both the answer and explanation) by the partici-
pants in the cued and uncued conditions. On average, par-
ticipants in the uncued condition correctly solved 23.4% of
initial problems and 35.3% of transfer problems. Participants
in the cued condition correctly solved an average of 33.6%
of initial problems and 69.7% of transfer problems. To com-
pare the performance of the cued and uncued participants, a
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the propor-
tion of the initial and transfer problems correctly solved as the
within-subjects factor and the condition as the between-subjects
factor.
The results of the ANOVA indicated that there was a main
effect of problem, F(1,78) = 64.55, p < 0.001 and of condition,
F(1,78) = 16.45, p < 0.001. These main effects were quali-
ﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1,78) = 16.45, p < 0.001
indicating that participants in the cued and uncued condi-
tions performed differently depending on the problem. Probing
the interaction we ﬁnd that there was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the average proportion of initial problems answered
correctly by participants in the cued and uncued conditions,
F(1,78) = 3.42, p = 0.068. However, those in the cued condi-
tion, on average, correctly solved a signiﬁcantly larger propor-
tion of transfer problems than those in the uncued condition,
F(1,78) = 39.38, p < 0.001, d = 1.07. Both those in the cued
and uncued conditions showed a signiﬁcant increase from ini-
tial to transfer, F(1,78) = 69.11, p < 0.001, d = 1.23 and
F(1,78) = 8.28, p = 0.005, d = 0.45, respectively. After watching
cues on the training problems, participants in the cued condition
solved nearly twice the proportion of transfer problems correctly
as compared to participants in the uncued condition. These
results demonstrate that the visual cues signiﬁcantly improve
performance on the transfer problem. More importantly, the
results suggest that the visual cues promote higher level cogni-
tion as evinced by the improved performance on the transfer
problem.
COMPARING THE ATTENTION OF CORRECT AND INCORRECT SOLVERS
ON THE INITIAL PROBLEM
Madsen et al. (2012) showed that correct and incorrect solvers dif-
fer in their allocation of visual attention while solving problems
with diagrammatic features consistent with novice-like answers in
addition to thematically relevant regions. Speciﬁcally, participants
who answer the problems correctly spend signiﬁcantly more time
attending to the thematically relevant areas and a signiﬁcantly
smaller proportion of time attending to the features associated
with the novice-like answers than participants who answer the
problems incorrectly. The novice-like and thematically relevant
areas in the problems investigated in this study are depicted in
Figure 4. We performed a similar analysis to determine if the
correctness on the initial problem could be attributed to par-
ticipants’ attention in the thematically relevant and novice-like
regions.
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of training problems with the cue superimposed
from the (A) ball, (B) cart, (C) graph, and (D) skier problem sets,
respectively.The cue is represented by the colored shapes (and grayed
slopes for the Skier). The cues lasted for 8 s, and the numbers indicate the
order in which the shapes appeared on the ball and cart problems. The critical
information needed to solve each problem is as follows: in problem (A) the
balls will have the same average speed during the time interval in which they
travel the same distance. In problem (B) the shapes of the tracks are
irrelevant to the carts’ ﬁnal speeds due to the lack of friction, so it is only
necessary to compare the starting and ending heights of the carts. In
problem (C) the two objects represented in the graph will travel at the same
speed when they have equal slopes, as speed is the rate of change of
position. In problem (D) the change in potential energy depends only on the
change in vertical height for each segment.
FIGURE 3 |The average percentage of initial and transfer problems
answered correctly by participants in the cued and uncued conditions.
The error bars indicate ± 1 SE of the mean.
To analyze the eye movements, areas of interest (AOI) were
drawn around the thematically relevant and novice-like areas
associated with each problem with a border of 1.1◦ of visual
angle. The size of the areas was determined by using an error
propagation technique (Preston and Dietz, 1991) which took into
account both the eye tracker’s accuracy and the spatial extent of
the central fovea (0.5◦ and 1◦ of visual angle, respectively). When
comparing eye movements across several problems, the physical
sizes of the thematically relevant and novice-like areas are non-
constant and should be normalized. To do this, we divided the
percentage of dwell time in the AOI by the percentage of screen
that the AOI subtends. This produced a new measure, the per-
centage of total dwell time divided by the percentage of total area,
which is described as the domain relative ratio (Fletcher-Watson
et al., 2008).
Figure 5 shows the domain relative ratio spent by correct and
incorrect solvers in the thematically relevant and novice-like areas
while they solved the initial problem in each set. To compare
the proportion of time that correct and incorrect solvers spent
attending to the thematically relevant and novice-like areas, we
conducted two one-way ANOVAs with the domain relative ratio
as the dependent measure and correctness as the between-subjects
factor. The results indicate that those who solved the initial prob-
lem correctly had a signiﬁcantly larger domain relative ratio in the
thematically relevant area, F(1,318) = 13.20, p < 0.001, d = 0.44
while simultaneously spending a signiﬁcantly smaller domain rel-
ative ratio in the novice-like area, F(1,318) = 14.85, p < 0.001,
d = 0.47. These results are consistent with Madsen et al.’s (2012)
ﬁndings.
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FIGURE 4 | An example of the thematically relevant area and
novice-like area in an initial problem. Respectively, these areas are
associated with the correct response (time interval when the balls travel
the same distance) and most common incorrect response (time when the
balls are at the same position).
FIGURE 5 |The domain relative ratio (percentage of dwell time divided
by the percentage of area the AOI encompasses) in the thematically
relevant and novice-like areas on the initial problem by the correctness
of response. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean.
ATTENTION WHILE THE CUE PLAYED
Participants in the cued condition were required to play the cues
on the training problems at least once, but were allowed to replay
the cue as many times as desired. The vast majority of the time
the participants chose to play the cues just once, accounting for
90.4% of all training problems solved. The cue was played twice
8.1%of the time, 55.4%of which occurred during the ﬁrst training
problem in a set.
We investigated whether participants who most needed to see
the cue (namely those who provided an incorrect response to
the immediately preceding problem in the set) actually watched
the cue while it was on screen. We found that those who
switched to a correct response had, on average, a domain
relative ratio of 16.5 spent watching the cue while it was
on screen, while those who retained an incorrect response
had a domain relative ratio of 13.2. To compare these val-
ues, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with the domain rel-
ative ratio as the dependent measure and correctness pattern
as the between-subjects factor. The results indicated that the
cued participants who switched to a correct response spent
a signiﬁcantly larger proportion of time per area watching
the cue, F(1,277) = 7.71, p = 0.006, d = 0.34. This
result demonstrates that watching the cue more closely can
be tied to participants switching from an incorrect to correct
response.
CHANGES IN EYE MOVEMENTS AMONG PARTICIPANTS WHO
DEMONSTRATED LEARNING
Thus far, we have demonstrated that cues can be an effective
learning tool and that there is a link between the correctness
of a student’s response and their allocation of attention while
solving the problem. We now consider the subset of partici-
pants who we can reasonably assume learned something—that
is, those who answered the initial problem incorrectly, but
after working through the training problems were successful in
correctly solving the transfer problem. Each case in which a
participant demonstrated learning was treated as an indepen-
dent observation in the analyses described later in this section.
Across all problem sets, we have 66 cases (34 unique par-
ticipants) of this occurring in the cued group and 30 cases
(21 unique participants) in the uncued group, corresponding
to 89.5% and 50.0% of participants in the cued and uncued
groups, respectively. There was signiﬁcantly greater number
of participants in the cued condition following this pattern
than in the uncued condition, χ2(1, N = 320) = 24.83,
p < 0.001, V = 0.279. The number of participants demon-
strating learning on one or more problems is provided in
Table 1.
As indicated by Table 1, the analyses reported below con-
tained cases in which some participants contributed only a single
observation, whereas other participants contributed multiple
observations, across all problem sets. Thus, we did not include
“problem set” as a within-subjects factor in our analyses due to
missing data. Because having different numbers of observations
across problem sets as a function of participants could create addi-
tional within-subject dependencies in our analyses, we carried
out a robustness check. Speciﬁcally, we carried out the analyses
discussed in this section on a randomly selected subsample of
the data in which no participant contributed more than a sin-
gle observation. The results of these additional analyses showed
the same pattern of results reported below—all signiﬁcant main
Table 1 |The number of problem sets in which participants
demonstrated learning in the cued and uncued conditions.









Cue (N = 38) 11 16 5 2
No cue (N = 42) 13 7 1 0
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effects and interactions reported below were also signiﬁcant with
only the randomly chosen subsample. Therefore, for all analyses
reported in this section, we have included the full data set shown
in Table 1.
Attention in the thematically relevant area
After ﬁnding that correct solvers spent a signiﬁcantly larger pro-
portion of their time attending to the relevant area, we wanted
to see if the participants who demonstrated learning had an
increased domain relative ratio in the transfer problem. Figure 6
shows the domain relative ratio that cued and uncued partic-
ipants spent in the relevant area on the initial and transfer
problems.
A repeated measures ANOVA with domain relative ratio in the
thematically relevant area as the dependentmeasure and condition
as the between-subjects factor was conducted. There was a signiﬁ-
cant increase in the domain relative ratio in the relevant area from
the initial to the transfer problem, F(1,94) = 56.41, p < 0.001 and
a signiﬁcant main effect of condition, F(1,94) = 4.12, p = 0.045.
However, these main effects are qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant inter-
action, F(1,94) = 10.17, p = 0.002, indicating that the cued and
uncued groups performed differently depending on the problem.
Probing the interaction we ﬁnd that the domain relative ratio of
both the cued and uncued groups increased signiﬁcantly from ini-
tial to transfer problem, F(1,94) = 14.94, p < 0.001, d = 0.79
and F(1,94) = 41.63, p < 0.001, d = 1.35, respectively. However,
while there was no signiﬁcant difference between the cued and
uncued conditions on the initial problem, F(1,94) < 1, the uncued
condition had a signiﬁcantly higher domain relative ratio in the
relevant area than the cued condition on the transfer problem,
F(1,94) = 14.25, p < 0.001, d = 0.65.
Inconsistent with the processing prioritization hypothesis,
among participants who showed evidence of learning (i.e.,
improved performance on the transfer problem relative to the
FIGURE 6 |The domain relative ratio (percentage of dwell time divided
by the percentage of area the AOI encompasses) in the thematically
relevant area on the initial and transfer problems for those who
improved from the initial to transfer problem.The error bars indicate ± 1
SE of the mean.
initial problem), those who saw cues had a signiﬁcantly smaller
domain relative ratio in the relevant area on the transfer prob-
lem than those who did not see cues. This is despite the fact that
solvers in the cued condition received training to attend the rele-
vant area. This result is surprising, and seems to pose a paradox.
Namely, why would those trained to attend to the relevant area
spend less time attending to the relevant area than those who were
not trained to do so? A possible solution of this paradox is given by
the automatization hypothesis, namely that those who were given
training with the cues may have developed greater automaticity in
extracting the relevant information, and thus spent proportion-
ally less time attending to the relevant area of the transfer problem
than those solvers who did not receive the cued training (i.e., the
uncued participants).
Automaticity in extracting relevant information
We hypothesized that the reason the cued group had a smaller
domain relative ratio in the thematically relevant area on the trans-
fer problem than the uncued group was because the cued group
was able to more easily extract the relevant information from the
diagram, namely the automatization hypothesis. If so, evidence
for the increased efﬁciency of relevant information extraction
should be found by examining their performance on the training
problems. Speciﬁcally, participants in the cued condition should
have had greater success in extracting the relevant information
over more trials than participants in the uncued condition, which
would then produce greater automaticity of extracting relevant
information for the cued group. A test of this hypothesis is shown
in Figure 7, which shows student performance across all problems
within the sets.
Consistent with the automatization hypothesis, among cued
participants who answered the initial problem incorrectly, we ﬁnd
that 73%were able to correctly solve the ﬁrst training problem, and
the proportion increased to 92% by the sixth training problem.
In contrast, only 20% of the uncued group answered the ﬁrst
training problem correctly, and by the sixth problem 73% were
FIGURE 7 |The performance on each problem for the subset of
participants who shifted from an incorrect response on the initial
problem to a correct response on the transfer problem.
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correct. Because a larger proportion of participants in the cued
group were able to answer the training problems correctly, they
had more practice doing so, and thus gained more automaticity
in extracting the relevant information. In addition, the increase
in percentage of correct responses in the two groups from the
sixth training problem to the transfer problem was greater for the
uncued group – that is, getting the transfer problem correct was a
bigger leap for more of those in the uncued condition than those
in the cued condition.
To statistically compare the cued and uncued participants’ per-
formance depicted in Figure 7, a survival analysis was conducted.
To do this, the training problem number in which the partici-
pant switched to providing only correct responses was considered.
Comparing the resulting survival curves using a log-rank test indi-
cates that the participants who saw cues on the training problems
switched to a correct response signiﬁcantly earlier than those in
the uncued group. χ2(1, N = 96) = 16.17, p < 0.001. Altogether,
these conditions likely led to the cued group having greater ease
of extracting the relevant information (indicated by the smaller
domain relative ratio) on the transfer problem than the uncued
group (as shown in Figure 6).
Average ﬁxation duration in the thematically relevant area
A further test of the automatization hypothesis is in terms of the
successful problem solvers’ average ﬁxation durations. We would
expect that increased ease of extracting the relevant information,
namely greater automaticity, would be associated with shorter ﬁx-
ation durations in the relevant area. Table 2 shows the average
ﬁxation durations of the cued and uncued participants in the rel-
evant area and entire diagram for the transfer problems. (Note
that there was no cueing on the transfer problem, even in the cued
condition.)
The average ﬁxation durations of participants while solving
the transfer problems were compared using a 2 (cue vs. no
cue) × 2 (entire diagram vs. relevant area) ANOVA. The results
are summarized in Table 3.
A signiﬁcant interaction between the condition and area of
interest was found. Probing the signiﬁcant interaction,we ﬁnd that
within the relevant area, cuedparticipants had signiﬁcantly shorter
mean ﬁxation durations than those in the uncued condition.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the cued participants
had indeed developed greater automaticity in extracting infor-
mation from the relevant area than the uncued participants.
We also found that uncued participants had signiﬁcantly larger
ﬁxation durations in the relevant area of the diagram com-
pared to their average ﬁxation durations when considering the
Table 2 |The average fixation durations (in ms) ± 1 SE of the mean for
the cued and uncued groups in the relevant area and entire diagram
while viewing the transfer problems.
Area of interest Avg. fixation duration in ms (mean ± SE)
Cued (N = 66) Uncued (N = 30)
Relevant area 239 ± 10 280 ± 15
Entire diagram 227 ± 6 219 ± 7
Table 3 | Results of a 2 (cue vs. no cue) × 2 (entire diagram vs. relevant
area) ANOVA comparing the average fixation duration on the transfer
problem.
Effect F (1,94) p d
Main effect of area (entire diagram vs.
relevant area)
23.33 <0.001 0.42
Main effect of condition (cued vs.
uncued)
1.72 0.193 –
Interaction of area × condition 10.87 0.001 –
Simple effect of area (cue only) 1.88 0.174 –
Simple effect of area (uncued only) 24.01 <0.001 0.96
Simple effect of condition (entire
diagram only)
<1 n.s. –
Simple effect of condition (relevant
area only)
10.90 0.001 0.64
entire diagram. However, for those in the cued group, the aver-
age ﬁxation duration in the relevant area is not distinguishable
from the rest of the problem. The combination of these results
indicates that cued participants experience a greater ease of extrac-
tion of the relevant information on the transfer problem, as
evidenced by their lower ﬁxation durations. This would explain
why the cued group spends a smaller proportion of time attend-
ing to the relevant area on the transfer problem (as shown in
Figure 6).
DISCUSSION
In this study we investigated the relationship between the low-
level perceptual processes involved in overt attentional selection by
visual cues, on the one hand, and the high-level cognitive processes
involved in solving physics problems. Eye movements can be used
to elucidate what information within a diagram is being processed
and when that information is being processed. This allows for us
to investigate how participants’ attention changes over time and
relevant cognitive processes associated with problem solving. In
the following sections, we revisit our hypotheses and discuss our
ﬁndings.
CORRECTNESS
Based on the changes we made in the current study in com-
parison to our previous studies, we were able to show that
visual cues did indeed improve problem solving on the trans-
fer problems. The changes we made were those suggested by
consideration of both Ohlsson’s (1992) representational change
theory and de Koning and colleagues framework of attention
cueing (de Koning et al., 2009). In particular, we told solvers
that the cues were meant to help them, we provided correct-
ness feedback to induce impasses among those who originally
had an incorrect solution path, and we included visual cues
that facilitated not only attentional selection of relevant infor-
mation, but also integration of that information across different
regions of the problem. Doing so indeed facilitated solver’s abil-
ity to re-represent the problem in a meaningful way allowing for
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1094 | 10
Rouinfar et al. Visual cues facilitate automaticity
the extraction of the relevant information and thus improved
performance.
We found a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of participants
who received training with visual cues were able to subse-
quently correctly solve the transfer problem without cues than
those who received training in the uncued condition. We
observed that both the cued and uncued groups performed sim-
ilarly on the initial problem and both experienced signiﬁcant
increase in performance from the initial to transfer problem.
However, nearly twice as many participants in the cued con-
dition were able to correctly solve the transfer problem as
compared to participants in the uncued condition (69.7 vs.
35.5%, respectively). This amounted to more than one stan-
dard deviation difference between the groups. These results
provide evidence that the visual cues facilitated the partici-
pants to re-represent the problem enabling them to break an
impasse and solve the problem correctly. More importantly,
these results provide evidence, consistent with previous stud-
ies (Thomas and Lleras, 2009) that manipulation of low-level
eye movements can inﬂuence high level cognition involved in
problem solving. Nevertheless, there is a critically important dif-
ference between the results of our studies and those of Grant
and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007, 2009), who
proposed the provocative idea that simply having the viewer’s
low-level attentional movements embody a problem’s solution
is sufﬁcient to facilitate ﬁnding the correct solution. Speciﬁ-
cally, our research, including both the current and previous
studies (Madsen et al., 2013a,b) has shown that while attending
to relevant information in a problem is a necessary condition
for correctly solving the problem, it is generally not sufﬁ-
cient to correctly solving it. The current study has speciﬁcally
shown that cues, which both draw attention to solution-relevant
information, and facilitate organizing and integrating it, facil-
itate both immediate problem solving and generalization of
that ability to new problems. In addition, the current study
shows that when such cues are used across multiple prob-
lems, solvers can automatize the extraction of problem-relevant
information.
CHANGES IN EYE MOVEMENTS
In the current study, we were particularly interested in the
online processes linking overt attentional selection with higher-
level cognitive processes involved in problem solving. Thus, we
explored how participants’ attention in the relevant area of the
diagram changed from the initial problem to the transfer prob-
lem. For this set of analyses, we considered the subgroup of
participants who demonstrated improvement in their problem
solving from the initial to transfer problem. We focused on
this subgroup as they were the ones who through the improve-
ment of their responses from the initial to transfer problem,
showed evidence that higher order cognitive processes were
online.
We presented two competing hypotheses for how cued and
uncued participants’ attention in the thematically relevant area
of the diagram would compare on the transfer problem. The
processing priority hypothesis was that through training of atten-
tional prioritization, solvers in the cued condition would spend
a larger percentage of dwell time per percentage of area attend-
ing to the relevant features on the transfer problem, namely a
higher domain relative ratio in the relevant area of the trans-
fer problem for the cued group compared to the uncued group.
Alternatively, the automatization hypothesis was that repeated
training in attending to and extracting relevant information
from a problem type would increase participants’ efﬁciency
in doing so, and therefore participants in the cued condi-
tion would have shorter ﬁxation durations on the relevant
features on the transfer problem than those in the uncued
group.
We found that successful problem solvers attend to the relevant
information in the diagram signiﬁcantly more than unsuccess-
ful solvers. When provided with cues on the training problems,
participants who successfully switch to correct responses overtly
attend to the cue signiﬁcantly more closely. Among the subset
of participants who improved their performance from the ini-
tial to transfer problem, we found that the cued group nearly
doubled their percentage of dwell time per percentage of area in
the thematically relevant area while those in the uncued condi-
tion more than tripled the domain relative ratio in the relevant
area.
While the cued participants had a signiﬁcantly larger domain
relative ratio in the relevant area of the transfer problem than they
did while solving the initial problem, it was still signiﬁcantly less
than the domain relative ratio of uncued group on the transfer
problem. To investigate if this result could be tied to the cued
group having developed an increased ease of extraction of the
relevant information, we examined the participants’ performance
on the training problems as well as their average ﬁxation durations
while solving the initial and transfer problems.
In examining the training problem performance of those
who improved from the initial to transfer problem, we found
that the cued group showed a signiﬁcant increase on the ﬁrst
training problem, followed by a more gradual increase on sub-
sequent training problems. By contrast the uncued group showed
a slower increase from the ﬁrst training problem through the
sixth training problem with nearly the same proportion of suc-
cessful solvers on the sixth training problem that the cued
group had on the ﬁrst. This difference in the trajectories of
the cued and uncued subgroups going from incorrectly solv-
ing the initial problem to correctly solving the transfer prob-
lem indicates that participants in the cued group had acquired
greater practice than those in the uncued group in extract-
ing information from the relevant area because they correctly
solved a larger proportion of training problems. Therefore,
the cued group would have achieved greater automaticity in
extracting the relevant problem information than the uncued
group. This conclusion is consistent with our ﬁnding that the
cued group showed a lower mean ﬁxation duration in the rel-
evant area on the transfer problem compared to the uncued
group.
An open question for further research is the degree to which the
cueing effects in the current study were predicated on telling the
solvers that the cues were helpful. Based on the previous results of
Thomas andLleras (2007,2009), in our previous studieswedidnot
inform solvers that the cues would be helpful, but we found only
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moderate effects of visual cueing on overt attention and successful
problem solving. The current study did tell solvers that the cues
were“hints”meant to help them, and found strong effects of visual
cueing on both overt attention and successful problem solving.
Further research can experimentally vary whether solvers are told
about the helpfulness of cues and see the degree to which this is
important.
A further open question is the degree to which forcing the
initially incorrect solvers into an impasse, either explicitly by pro-
viding them with correctness feedback, or implicitly by providing
them with visual cues that focus on information they have pre-
viously ignored, is critical for creating strong effects of cueing on
attentional selection and successful insight problem solving. The
current study found that both cueing and correctness feedback
facilitated solvers to make the transition from incorrect solution
paths to correct solution paths. Interestingly, cueing by itself was
more effective than feedback by itself. This raises the question of
whether both created impasses. Further research will be needed to
create on-line measures of impasse in both cueing and feedback
conditions to determine the effects of each on entering an impasse
during insight problem solving.
In summary, the current study has shown two important ﬁnd-
ings. First, short duration visual cues can improve problem solving
performance on a variety of insight physics problems, including
transfer problems that do not share the surface features of the
training problems, but do share the underlying solution path. In
other words, visual cues can facilitate solvers to re-represent a
problem and overcome impasse thereby enabling them to cor-
rectly solve a problem. These cueing effects on problem solving
were not predicated upon the solvers’ overt or covert attentional
shifts necessarily embodying the solution to the problem. Instead,
the cueing effects were predicated upon having solvers attend
to and integrate relevant information in the problems into a
solution path. Second, these short duration visual cues when
administered repeatedly over multiple training problems resulted
in participants becoming more efﬁcient at extracting the rele-
vant information on the transfer problem, showing that such
cues can improve the automaticity with which solvers extract
relevant information from a problem. These results, when com-
bined with those of our previous studies (Madsen et al., 2013a,b)
suggest that low-level attentional selection processes provide a
necessary gateway for relevant information to be used in prob-
lem solving, but are generally not sufﬁcient for correct problem
solving. Instead, factors that lead a solver to an impasse (e.g.,
correctness feedback) and to organize and integrate problem
information (e.g., organization and integration cues) also greatly
facilitate arriving at correct solutions. We are currently studying
the speciﬁc effects of these factors on problem solving within
the context of a model of the role of visual cueing in concep-
tual problem solving (Rouinfar et al., 2014). Further research
along these lines will enable us to more precisely understand the
role of lower-level attentional selection in higher-level problem
solving.
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